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S ince the summer of 2007, sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) have received heightened international media attention and public policy scrutiny, as 
these government-owned funds have been involved in 
the purchase of minority equity positions in several 
world-class companies. Due to this increase in company-
oriented equity investment by SWFs, there has been a 
growing concern among many Western governments that 
these government-owned investment funds could be used 
to advance a home-country geopolitical agenda contrary 
to the “national security” of the host country.1 These na-
tional security concerns include inefficient allocation of 
firm resources (exacting a real cost on host economies), 
destabilization of financial markets (to the detriment 
of the host country), protection of SWF home-country 
industries at the expense of the host country’s industries, 
and the expropriation of technology (Markheim, 2008). 
Likewise, these national security concerns are problem-
atic for executives who may have an interest in attract-
ing SWF equity investment to their firms, as they could 
have a potential adverse impact on their own company’s 
sustainable competitive advantage in the global business 
 551
The proliferation of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) has resulted in an unstable political, legal, and 
regulatory environment for this form of foreign direct investment (FDI). This article explains SWF growth 
over the last half-century; discusses issues surrounding SWF “transparency” and host-country national 
security risk; reviews the legal and regulatory structures governing FDI in major national economies; ex-
amines proposed regulatory approaches to structure the FDI environment; and concludes with a discus-
sion of SWF regulatory policy recommendations addressing corporate governance principles, national 
security restrictions on equity investment, and investment reciprocity, and suggests recommendations 
for executives considering engaging an SWF investment partner. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
Sovereign Wealth Funds: 
National Security Risks 
in a Global Free Trade 
Environment





Published online in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com). 
© 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. • DOI: 10.1002/tie.20299
environment. These potential national and firm security 
risks, and proposed SWF regulatory policy and executive 
management recommendations addressing these con-
cerns, are the focus of this article.
As a result of the U.S. subprime mortgage “melt-
down” (that began in August 2007), the financial sec-
tor has successfully sought and received investments 
from SWFs (Goodman & Story, 2008).2 Since early 
2007, SWFs have invested billions of dollars of much-
needed capital into major American and foreign banks 
negatively impacted by the financial credit crisis. Many 
SWFs are attracted to investment opportunities that ac-
cept their money without them having to acquire too 
large an equity stake—an investment opportunity often 
found in the financial sector (“The New Rothschilds,” 
2007).3 According to economic research firm Dealogic, 
SWFs are estimated to have invested $37.9 billion in the 
U.S. financial sector (and over $50 billion in all West-
ern financial institutions) in 2007 (Rothnie, 2008). 
The U.S.-focused SWF investments represent 63% of 
total estimated SWF investment for 2007 (Rothnie, 
2008).
Some examples of these SWF investments will il-
lustrate this recent level of buying activity, both in the 
United States and abroad. In September 2007, the Bourse 
Dubai SWF purchased 19.9% of the Nasdaq stock market 
and Nasdaq’s 28% share of the London Stock Exchange 
(Cho, 2008). In December 2007, the China Investment 
Corporation (or CIC, formed in September 2007) agreed 
to purchase 9.9% of Morgan Stanley, the investment 
banking firm, for $5 billion, and in February 2008, CIC’s 
representatives signed a $4 billion agreement with J.C. 
Flowers & Company, a private equity fund, to invest funds 
in U.S. companies (Badian & Harrington, 2008; Chen, 
2008). In January 2008, Merrill Lynch sold a special class 
of stock worth $6.6 billion to sovereign wealth funds 
managed by the South Korean and Kuwaiti governments, 
while Citigroup announced the sale of 7.8% of its stock 
to a group of investors that includes the Singapore In-
vestment Corporation (Cho, 2008). Through the first six 
months of 2008, SWFs played a significant role in stabiliz-
ing global credit markets by injecting more than $80 bil-
lion in equity stakes in U.S.-based Merrill Lynch and Mor-
gan Stanley, Swiss-based UBS AG, and U.K.-based Barclays 
PLC (Koh, 2008). Furthermore, in November 2008, Bar-
clays PLC, in order to raise $10.5 billion to comply with 
new capital requirements, sold 31% of its outstanding 
shares in convertible and preferred stock to SWFs in Abu 
Dhabi and Qatar (Livesey & Crowley, 2008).
In the second half of 2008, many SWFs, primarily 
from oil-rich nations whose domestic budgets require a 
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break-even price of $50 per barrel of crude light oil (up 
from approximately $20 per barrel in 2000–2002), are 
reassessing the importance of liquidity and uninspired 
“safe” assets and considering channeling increasing 
SWF investments into their domestic industries with 
the national goal of developing a sustainable economic 
and financial system (Waki, 2008).4 Other emerging 
SWF investment strategies being seriously considered 
in the recent era of worldwide recession and declining 
oil prices are “reciprocal investment” in infrastructure, 
energy, and technology and searching for strategic 
opportunities in emerging markets (“Krull Corpora-
tion President Says Leading Sovereign Wealth Funds,” 
2008; Zawya, 2008).5 A recent example of this type of 
medium-term SWF investment strategy is the recent 
$8 billion General Electric (GE) joint venture with 
Abu Dhabi’s SWF Mubadala, with Mubadala accessing 
GE’s expertise in Medicare and engineering, while 
exploiting growth opportunities in the Middle East 
and Africa (Zawya, 2008).6 Furthermore, to support an 
SWF investment strategy built upon equity ownership 
in physical infrastructure, the CB Richard Ellis Group, 
Inc. (CBRE), the world’s largest commercial real es-
tate services firm, forecasts that SWFs are expected 
to become one of the most important investors in the 
world’s commercial property markets through 2015 (al-
though more than half of all SWFs are believed to pres-
ently hold direct commercial real estate investments) 
(CB Richard Ellis, 2008). Anticipated expansion in this 
investment strategy will increase total SWF real estate 
holdings from 4% of their present portfolio to 7%, or 
approximately $725 billion in net property investments 
over a seven-year time frame (based upon a Morgan 
Stanley estimated worldwide SWF asset growth to a 
valuation of approximately $12 trillion by 2015 [Jen, 
2007]) (CB Richard Ellis, 2008).7
While there is no consensus on a universal defini-
tion of what constitutes a “sovereign wealth fund,” one 
offered by the U.S. Department of the Treasury (and 
the working definition used in this article) defines SWFs 
as “government investment vehicles funded by foreign 
exchange assets and managed separately from official 
reserves” of government monetary authorities, with fund 
managers seeking higher financial returns (U.S. Depart-
ment of the Treasury, 2007a).8 According to the Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF; 2007), there are three 
primary types of SWFs: stabilization funds, savings and 
intergenerational funds, and reserve investment corpo-
rations. Stabilization funds are designed to smooth out 
a nation’s short-term budgetary or reserve developments 
due to adverse price fluctuations in natural resources 
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Savings and intergenera-
tional funds are designed to 
be a storehouse of wealth for 
future generations, spreading 
the financial returns from the 
nation’s natural resources (in 
many cases) across genera-
tions in an equitable manner. 
The economic  History  of  Sovere ign 
Weal th  funds
The concept of SWFs began in the early 1950s (although 
the formal term sovereign wealth fund did not appear until 
the dawning of the twenty-first century) when the Kuwait 
Investment Board (in 1965, replaced by the Kuwait Invest-
ment Authority) was established in 1953 by the govern-
ment of Kuwait and charged with the responsibility for 
holding and investing surplus oil revenue in foreign assets, 
thus reducing the country’s nearly singular reliance on 
finite oil reserves (Kern, 2007). Kuwait was followed in 
1956 by the British colonial administration in the Gilbert 
Islands (that in 1979 became the independent Republic 
of Kiribati) establishing the Revenue Equalisation Fund, 
an SWF charged with holding royalties accumulated from 
phosphate mining in trust and its managers with making 
overseas financial investment decisions (Kern, 2007). With 
the exception of the New Mexico State Investment Office 
Trust Funds (USA), established in 1958, growth in SWFs 
remained dormant throughout the 1960s and early 1970s.
In the mid-1970s, the first wave of SWFs appeared 
(largely, but not exclusively, as a result of the OPEC oil 
“shock” beginning in 1973), with the establishment of 
Singapore’s Temasek Holdings and Papua New Guinea’s 
Mineral Resources Stabilization Fund, both in 1974, and 
the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority and Canada’s Alberta 
Heritage Fund, among others, in 1976 (Kern, 2007). This 
(oil and minerals), commodities, or foreign exchange 
operations (Kern, 2007). These funds tend to be more 
conservative in their investment strategy, focusing on 
fixed income rather than equity investments (Ziemba, 
2007). Savings and intergenerational funds are designed 
to be a storehouse of wealth for future generations, 
spreading the financial returns from the nation’s natu-
ral resources (in many cases) across generations in an 
equitable manner (Kern, 2007).
The IMF reports that, while the newer oil-based SWFs 
are predominantly focused on stabilization objectives, the 
increase in the price of oil in 2006 and 2007 has permit-
ted these funds to have longer investment horizons and, 
thus, invest in a broader asset range, including bonds, 
real estate, private equity, hedge funds, and commodities 
(IMF, 2007). Reserve investment corporations are de-
signed to reduce the opportunity cost of holding excess 
foreign reserves, or to invest their funds in private equity 
having higher financial return (IMF, 2007). These SWFs 
also tend to be the least transparent in their investment 
strategies. Because of a general lack of SWF “transpar-
ency” (i.e., disclosure of information about the funds’ 
assets, liabilities, or underlying investment strategy),9 the 
governments of the United States, France, and Germany 
are considering financial regulatory responses to SWF 
behavior, while the Canadian government is considering 
a review of its foreign investment and ownership rules for 
its domestic corporations (Badian & Harrington, 2008; 
Markheim, 2008).
Following this general introduction to SWFs, the 
author will place SWFs in an historical context by ex-
plaining the economic growth of SWFs over the last half-
century. In the next section, the author discusses issues 
surrounding SWF “transparency” questions and strategic 
asset risk (political-, economic-, and defense-related) for 
host countries, resulting from the change in the invest-
ment strategy of many SWFs. The author then turns to 
discussing the existing legal and regulatory structure 
governing foreign direct investment (FDI) in major 
national economies, and examines the regulatory ap-
proaches being considered by multilateral organizations 
and national governments to effectively structure the in-
vestment environment for SWFs. The author concludes 
the article with a discussion of SWF regulatory policy 
recommendations, focusing on the dual objectives of 
meeting legitimate political-, economic-, and defense-
related issues, while ensuring the future “free” flow of 
this specific form of FDI into host-country markets, and 
offering executive management recommendations to 
follow when a company is considering engaging in an 
SWF investment strategy.
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exchange reserves, a result of trade surpluses (Badian 
& Harrington, 2008). Previously, SWF managers chose 
conservative investments, such as foreign government 
securities, but then sought a higher return (and accepted 
higher risk) in their investment capital choices (Badian & 
Harrington, 2008). According to International Financial 
Services, London, and investment firm Morgan Stanley, 
SWFs are forecasted to grow to $10 trillion by 2015 (Jen 
& Andreopoulos, 2008; Monaghan, 2008). 
In June 2008, the Monitor Group, a Cambridge, 
Massachusetts–based business consulting and research 
firm, released an empirical study of 17 SWFs involved with 
785 deals (most transactions originating in the Middle 
East and Asia) worth $251 billion between 2000 and 2008 
(Miracky et al., 2008). The study results suggest that the 
SWFs are driven primarily by financial objectives,12 and 
that the Middle East and East Asian SWFs are not active in 
any ways that threaten the economic or national security of 
the nations in which they invest.13 Furthermore, SWFs do 
take majority equity interests in more than half of publicly 
acknowledged SWF transactions, but the overwhelming 
majority of these transactions have taken place in their 
domestic and emerging markets, and not Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) coun-
tries. Finally, the Monitor Group study results show that 
SWFs had been building progressively increased financial 
risk into their financial portfolios, investing in less conser-
vative asset classes and slowly emerging markets. 
Transparency Issues and Strategic 
Asset  risk
Many Western countries have raised national security 
policy concerns about recent SWF investment activities, 
SWF initial growth wave continued into the mid-1980s, 
culminating in Norway’s Government Petroleum Fund’s 
establishment in 1986 (Kern, 2007). By 1990, SWFs held 
approximately $500 billion in their investment funds 
(Lachman, 2008). The second wave of SWFs began at the 
end of the 1990s, starting with the Hong Kong Monetary 
Authority Investment in 1998 Portfolio and Venezuela’s 
Investment Fund for Macroeconomic Stabilization in 
1998, and has continued unabated into the first decade 
of the twenty-first century (Kern, 2007). From 2000, the 
number of SWFs identified has more than doubled, from 
20 to 43 such government-owned investment funds (John-
son, 2007; Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, 2008c).10 
Since 2005, there has been an acceleration in SWF cre-
ation, with 12 SWFs established, including the above men-
tioned CIC, ranked by initial investment reserve ($200 
billion) among the world’s top ten largest SWFs (Kern, 
2007; Kimmitt, 2008; Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, 
2008c).
As of October 2008, the Sovereign Wealth Fund 
Institute (2008b), a nonprofit, nonpartisan research or-
ganization located in Roseville, California, estimates that 
the combined SWFs of all countries is $3.927 trillion, with 
63.9% ($2.509 trillion) oil– and gas–related and 36.1% 
($1.418 trillion) in other commodities.11 The Sovereign 
Wealth Fund Institute (2008b) estimates that the world’s 
top ten largest SWFs (see Table 1) account for $3.239.4 
trillion in assets, or 82.5% of the world’s SWF assets. 
International Financial Services, London, has estimated 
that total SWFs grew by 18% in 2007 (Monaghan, 2008). 
Why the rapid increase in the growth in the actual num-
ber and dollar value of SWFs? Since 2005, the primary 
driving forces have been the increase in commodity 
prices, especially oil, and the high volume of foreign 
Country Fund Name Assets($ Billions) Fund Inception Origin
UAE-Abu Dhabi Abu Dhabi Investment Authority $875.0 1976 Oil
Norway Government Pension Fund—Global $396.5 1990 Oil
Saudi Arabia SAMA Foreign Holdings $365.2 n/a Noncommodity
Singapore Government of Singapore Investment Corporation $330.0 1981 Noncommodity
People’s Republic of China SAFE Investment Company $311.6 Oil
Kuwait Kuwait Investment Authority $264.4 1953 Oil
People’s Republic of China China Investment Corporation $200.0 2007 Noncommodity
China-Hong Kong Hong Kong Monetary Authority Investment Portfolio $173.0 1998 Noncommodity
Russia National Welfare Fund (includes Oil Fund) $189.7 2008 Oil
Singapore Temasek Holdings $134.0 1974 Noncommodity
Source: Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute (2008b).
table 1 Top Ten Largest Sovereign Wealth Funds
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munications, and transportation sectors of the economy, 
and use them as a geopolitical “weapons” against a host 
country (that also leads back to the issue of transpar-
ency of SWF investment motives). The Sovereign Wealth 
Fund Institute (2008a), a California-based financial re-
search firm, measures worldwide SWF transparency and 
investment strategy using the Linaburg-Maduell Index, 
developed by Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute founders 
Carl Linaburg and Michael Maduell, utilizing a scale of 1 
(lowest transparency) to 10 (highest transparency).16 Ac-
cording to the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute (2008a) 
(see Figure 1), SWFs for Kuwait (6),17 Abu Dhabi (3–5), 
and the People’s Republic of China (2) all fail to meet 
that no doubt has much to do with the fact that these 
host-country government-owned investment funds are 
emanating from authoritarian regimes in the Middle East 
and the People’s Republic of China, areas of the world 
that reflect political instability or have exhibited un-
friendly policies toward Western interests. These national 
security concerns14 are focused in two distinct, but inter-
related, areas: the first, a perceived lack by Western host 
countries of transparency of developing-country SWF 
operations and corporate governance structures, and the 
second, the potential for a rival nation employing SWF 
capital to acquire strategic corporate assets,15 especially in 
the financial, energy, information technology, telecom-
figure 1 Sovereign Wealth Funds: Strategy and Transparency
Source: Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute               Updated March 18 2008
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In countries lacking a founda-
tion of good corporate gover-
nance, SWF failures due to 
poor management—if concen-
trated within certain industry 
sectors—could destabilize na-
tional or global markets.
While the goal of an SWF is to ostensibly create long-
term, monetary value for a country’s financial reserves, 
the fact is that a government-owned investment fund may 
be motivated by strategic, noncommercial considerations 
in its investment decision-making calculus. Lyons (2007) 
and Luft (2008) argue that this form of “state capitalism” 
can be used to secure sensitive strategic assets in the in-
frastructure industries (e.g., telecommunications, media, 
energy, seaports, and financial services) and, in lieu of a 
direct military attack, undertake decisions contrary to the 
safety and security of the United States or other Western 
countries. Another concern is that a foreign government 
could use an SWF to acquire proprietary knowledge about 
how companies operate abroad, and then use this sensi-
tive knowledge to enhance the national competitiveness 
of their rival state-managed firms (Teslik, 2008). There 
is also the potential for SWFs from a region, such as the 
Middle East or Asia, to collaborate (as shareholders) to 
oust the chief executive officer of a U.S. corporation 
(Teslik, 2008). This begs the question: Is this collabora-
tive behavior for business reasons (“to institute effective 
business policies”) or political gain (“zero-sum game 
policies”) (Aizenman & Glick, 2007)? Financial market 
stability is another sensitive national competitiveness 
issue. Since SWFs are often of significant monetary size, 
concentrated, and nontransparent, actual or perceived 
shifts in fund asset allocation can cause adverse market 
volatility (Dohner, 2008). Lastly, while defense-related 
industries are usually considered not eligible for SWF 
investment, other forms of sensitive “dual-use” (civilian 
and military) technologies could fall into the possession 
of potential adversaries (Markheim, 2008). These SWF 
issues are of legitimate concern to Western policymakers, 
and their governments are contemplating public policy 
palliatives.
In the U.S. (where the majority of SWF investment 
has recently taken place), largely as a result of the pub-
lic furor over the People’s Republic of China’s govern-
ment-owned enterprise’s (CNOOC) attempt to acquire 
the U.S. oil firm Unocal in 2005, and the United Arab 
Emirates’ Dubai Ports World aborted attempt to acquire 
several major U.S. seaports in 2006, the U.S. Congress 
passed the Foreign Investment Security Act of 2007 
(FINSA), that went into effect on October 24, 2007. At 
its core, FINSA enhances the scope of authority of the 
U.S. government’s Committee on Foreign Investment in 
the United States (CFIUS), an oversight agency of the 
U.S. Department of the Treasury (Markheim, 2008).20 
Under CFIUS, foreign direct investments (FDIs)21 that 
raise national security concerns are voluntarily subject 
to a formal review process, and if found necessary, the 
the recommended minimum transparency rating of 8. 
Three countries at the opposite end of the transparency 
and investment strategy spectrum are Australia, Norway, 
and the United States (Alaska), that all have high levels 
of information disclosure and accountability and exhibit 
a “conventional” or “passive” investment strategy (Lyons, 
2007; Sovereign Wealth Fund, 2008a; Truman, 2007).18
Unlike privately owned, publicly regulated investment 
and pension funds, SWFs are under no financial regulatory 
obligation to provide operating information to sharehold-
ers or government agencies (Kern, 2007). In fact, unlike 
private hedge funds, SWFs are not necessarily driven by a 
need to generate a profit (“The Invasion of the Sovereign 
Wealth Funds,” 2008).19 Furthermore, there are no trans-
national regulations on SWF disclosure requirements con-
cerning investment strategies or current holdings (Weiss, 
2008). Why should this be of concern to Western policy-
makers? A lack of SWF transparency masks SWF investment 
activity and can obscure governance and risk-management 
problems within the funds (Weiss, 2008). This less-than-
ideal transparency situation makes it difficult to assess 
systematic risk, determine if SWFs are acquiring strategic 
assets for nationalistic objectives (Summers, 2007), and 
audit the governance of the funds, therefore exacerbating 
problems of mismanagement or corruption (e.g., illegal 
insider trading) by fund managers (Chatman Thomsen, 
2008). In countries lacking a foundation of good corporate 
governance, SWF failures due to poor management—if 
concentrated within certain industry sectors—could desta-
bilize national or global markets (Weiss, 2008).
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cies against this form of FDI, what Kimmit (2008) calls 
“counter-productive barriers to investments.” Of course, 
such protectionist policies are construed by many as re-
actionary to the global free flow of FDI—a hallmark of 
the twenty-first-century international economy. With cer-
tain exceptions for national security considerations, the 
United States is traditionally considered one of the most 
receptive world economies to FDI. As recently as May 
2007, President George W. Bush reaffirmed the U.S. com-
mitment to open economies, that thrive through recipro-
cal investment and trade (Dohner, 2008). In general, the 
European Union has reiterated its commitment to open 
markets and SWF investment as well, with the caveat that 
there is reciprocity in market openness to European FDI 
(Kern, 2007). Russia, a growing market economy (al-
though not a member of the European Union) and that, 
incidentally, operates a $32.7 billion SWF (funded by oil 
revenue), takes a relatively strong protectionist stance on 
FDI compared to its contemporaries in Western Europe 
(Kern, 2007; White, Davis, & Walker, 2008).
Many countries have enacted laws and instituted public 
policies that regulate FDI—generally, with an underlying 
regulatory focus on national security concerns. In a recent 
study undertaken by the US GAO (2008) to assess the laws 
and policies regulating FDI in ten countries (see Table 2), 
and comparing them to the U.S. legal and regulatory re-
gime, the US GAO found substantial similarity among the 
countries surveyed to the U.S. CFIUS investment review 
process enacted under the Exon-Florio Amendment.
committee can recommend to the President blockage 
of foreign government investments that are deemed to 
have potentially adverse national security implications 
(Markheim, 2008). Due to the recent enhancement 
of its scope of review authority, CFIUS now has added 
critical infrastructure (e.g., energy assets) and foreign 
government–controlled transactions as factors for re-
view, as well as greater transparency to its review process 
(Markheim, 2008).22 While the federal regulations is-
sued by the U.S. Department of the Treasury (2008b) to 
implement FINSA do not specifically address SWFs, they 
do help clarify the concept of foreign control as it relates 
to private equity ownership interest, passive investment, 
and the difference between “control” and “influence,” 
all factors for the CFIUS board or president to consider 
with a proposed or present SWF equity investment.23 
Also, U.S. Senator Richard Shelby (R-Alabama), ranking 
minority member of the U.S. Senate Banking, Housing, 
and Urban Affairs Committee, concerned about the in-
tentions and objectives of SWFs, has formally requested 
a study be undertaken by the Government Accountabil-
ity Office (US GAO, an agency of the U.S. Congress) to 
ensure that SWFs are “effectively monitored” (Badian & 
Harrington, 2008).24
financia l  regulatory  Pol icy
One major reaction to SWF behavior is the potential 
for national governments to institute protectionist poli-
Country Laws and Regulations Reasons for Review or Restrictions
Canada Investment Canada Act (1985) To ensure net benefit to Canada (no national security review)
People’s Republic of 
China
2006 Regulations for Mergers and Acquisitions of 
Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors, Catalog 
for the Guidance of Foreign Investment Industries
National economic security, protection of critical industries.  
Purchase of famous trademarks or traditional Chinese brands
France Law 2004-1343, Decree 2005-1739 Public order, public safety, national defense
Germany 2004 Amendment to 1961 Foreign Trade and  
Payments Act
Ensure essential security interests, prevent disturbance of peaceful 
international coexistence or foreign relations
India Foreign Exchange Management Act (1999) National security and domestic cultural and economic concerns
Japan 1991 Amendment to the Foreign Exchange and 
Foreign Trade Act of 1949
National security, public order, public safety, or the economy
The Netherlands Financial Supervision Act of  2006 Competition, financial market oversight (no national security review)
Russia 1999 Federal Law on Foreign Investments Protection of foundations of the constitutional order, national  
defense and state security, antimonopoly
United Arab Emirates Agencies Law of 1981; Companies Law of 1984 Economic and demographic concerns (no national security review)
United Kingdom Enterprise Act of 2002 Public interest, control of classified and sensitive technology
United States Exon-Florio Amendment to the Defense Production 
Act of 1950, as amended
National security
Source: US GAO (2008).
table 2 Laws and Regulations Addressing Review of Foreign Direct Investment  
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national Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the Or-
ganisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) identify “best practices” for SWFs in the areas 
of institutional structure, risk management, regulatory 
transparency, and accountability of the implementing au-
thorities (Badian & Harrington, 2008; U.S. Department 
of the Treasury, 2007b). Also in October 2007, the IMF’s 
International Monetary and Financial Committee called 
on the Fund to engage with representatives of key SWFs, 
central banks, and finance ministries to assist in develop-
ing a voluntary set of best practices for SWF management 
(IMF, 2008a). After accepting this challenge, the IMF has 
since coordinated its activities with the OECD, the Euro-
pean Commission, and the World Bank (IMF, 2008a).
On February 27, 2008, the Commission of the European 
Communities released its principles for a voluntary code of 
SWF corporate governance that touts commercial goals, 
rather than strategic considerations, in investment strate-
gies (Commission of the European Communities, 2008). 
These principles support an open investment environment, 
multilateral cooperation on the development of a common 
framework for SWF investment, use of existing legal instru-
ments, respect of European Community obligations and 
international commitments, and regulatory proportionality 
and transparency (Commission of the European Communi-
ties, 2008).26 European Trade Commissioner Peter Mandel-
son said that if SWFs refuse to abide by a voluntary code of 
corporate governance, “pressure may grow for laws obliging 
them, at the least, to disclose their investments” (“EU to 
Consider Sovereign Wealth Fund,” 2008).
On March 20, 2008, representatives of the U.S. Depart-
ment of the Treasury, the governments of Singapore and 
Abu Dhabi, and their respective SWFs, GIC and ADIA, 
agreed on five basic corporate governance policy prin-
ciples for SWFs, in addition to four basic policy principles 
for host countries receiving SWF investment, in support of 
the processes under way by the OECD and IMF to develop 
voluntary best practices for SWFs (U.S. Department of the 
Treasury, 2008a). The policy principles for SWF corporate 
governance include: investment decisions should be based 
solely on commercial grounds, rather than geopolitical 
goals; there should be greater information disclosure 
regarding purpose, investment objectives, institutional ar-
rangements, and financial information; strong governance 
structures, internal controls, and operational and risk man-
agement systems should be in place; SWFs and the private 
sector should compete fairly; and SWFs should comply with 
host-country regulatory and disclosure requirements (U.S. 
Department of the Treasury, 2008a). The significance of 
GIC (Singapore) and ADIA (Abu Dhabi) participation is 
that both SWFs were ranked near the bottom in the Peter-
Eight [of the ten] countries use a formal review pro-
cess—usually conducted by a government economic 
body—to review a transaction. Generally, national 
security is a primary factor or one of several factors con-
sidered in evaluating transactions. While the concepts 
of national security vary from country to country, all 
countries share concerns about a core set of national 
security issues. These include, for example, the defense 
industrial base, and more recently, investment in the 
energy sector and investment by state-owned enter-
prises and sovereign wealth funds.
However, each of the 10 countries has its own concept 
of national security that influences which particular in-
vestments may be restricted. As a result of the differing 
concepts, restrictions range from requiring approval of 
investments in a narrowly defined defense sector to broad re-
strictions on the basis of economic security and cultural policy 
(emphasis added). (US GAO, 2008, p. 3)
Beyond the nearly universal acceptance of the narrow 
view of national security (i.e., “defense-related”), Canada, 
Japan, and the People’s Republic of China explicitly indi-
cate cultural nationalism or economic reasons as a basis for 
a review of FDI, while India specifies FDI restrictions per-
taining to specific industry sectors (e.g., retail and atomic 
energy are strictly prohibited), and the United Arab Emir-
ates include FDI restrictions (i.e., on equity ownership) 
ensuring their citizens’ involvement in its economy (US 
GAO, 2008). How often have these laws and regulations 
resulted in FDI being blocked or rejected? According to 
Kern’s (2007) study of five major countries’ economies (all 
included in the US GAO study), the evidence shows that 
Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom have never in-
voked these laws and regulations, while one case has been 
blocked in the United States and nine cases have been 
rejected in France (between 1992 and 1994 for “public 
order” reasons).25 This situation may be changing, as six 
of the countries studied by the U.S. Government Account-
ability Office (2008, p. 19) found government officials 
expressing specific concerns about foreign state-owned 
enterprises or SWFs. Regarding SWFs, these government 
officials’ concerns were “that they may be guided by politi-
cal objectives rather than profit maximization or that their 
financial decisions may be motivated by support for certain 
‘national champion’ companies.”
Multilateral public policy responses to SWFs (and 
similarly, to government-owned enterprises) have focused 
on the development of voluntary codes of corporate gov-
ernance. In October 2007, the G-7 finance ministers and 
central bank governors recommended (after pressure was 
applied by the United States and France) that the Inter-
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Code of Liberalisation of Capital Movements (that covers 
both long-term and short-term capital movements), ad-
opted in 1961, and the second, the OECD Declaration on 
International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, 
issued in 1976 and revised in 2000 (Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development, 2008c).31 Nev-
ertheless, the OECD recognizes the right of member coun-
tries to take appropriate actions to protect their national 
security when an SWF raises concerns as to whether its ob-
jectives are commercial or driven by political, defense, or 
foreign policy considerations (Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development, 2008c).
While there have been recent efforts to develop vol-
untary codes of corporate governance addressing SWF in-
vestment, there are also legal and regulatory efforts under 
way among several nations that will affect FDI decisions by 
state-owned enterprises and SWFs. In Europe, the German 
government is actively redrafting an update to its invest-
ment law that will establish a formal review process allowing 
the nation’s executive branch to block SWFs or other large, 
state-sponsored investment agency company acquisitions 
deemed of “strategic relevance” (Biberovic, 2008; Walker, 
2008). The Italian government of Prime Minister Silvio 
Berlusconi has established a “national interests committee” 
son Institute for International Economics “scorecard” on 
best corporate governance practices—GIC third from the 
bottom and AIDA last (Barkley, 2008).
On May 1, 2008, the IMF sponsored and established 
a 25-member International Working Group (IWG) of 
Sovereign Wealth Funds and charged it with developing 
voluntary principles based on economic and financial 
risk and return-related criteria for SWFs by October 2008 
(IMF, 2008b).27 This voluntary code draws on the exist-
ing body of principles and practices, including the IMF’s 
Guidelines for Foreign Exchange Reserve Management (2001); 
the OECD’s Guidelines for Corporate Governance of State 
Owned Enterprises (2007), that have applicability to both 
SWFs and state-owned enterprises, and the Commission 
of the European Communities’ A Common European Ap-
proach to Sovereign Wealth Funds (2008). On October 11, 
2008, the IWG of Sovereign Wealth Funds presented the 
result of their efforts, the “Santiago Principles,” to the 
IMF’s International Monetary and Financial Committee 
in Washington, D.C. (International Working Group of 
Sovereign Wealth Funds, 2008a). The Santiago Principles 
consist of 24 generally accepted principles and practices 
that properly reflect SWFs’ investment practices and 
objectives (International Working Group of Sovereign 
Wealth Funds, 2008b).28 The Santiago Principles cover 
three key areas: (1) legal framework, objectives, and co-
ordination with macroeconomic policies; (2) institutional 
framework and governance structure; and (3) investment 
and risk management framework.29
The guiding purpose of the Santiago Principles is to:
1. Have in place a transparent and sound governance 
structure that provides for adequate operational con-
trols, risk management, and accountability;
2. Ensure compliance with applicable regulatory and dis-
closure requirements in the countries in which SWFs 
invest;
3. Ensure SWFs invest on the basis of economic and fi-
nancial risk and return-related considerations; and
4. Help maintain a stable global financial system and free 
flow of capital and investment.
In June 2008, the OECD adopted a declaration wel-
coming investments by SWFs, and recommitted its mem-
bership to governing principles of investment openness 
and nondiscrimination (Mandelson, 2008; Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2008b).30 
This OECD declaration was soon followed in September 
2008 with an agreement among its members to base their 
investment policies on two existing investment instruments 
calling for fair treatment of investors: the first, the OECD 
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ment concerning this form of FDI. For financial service 
firms, recent SWF equity investment has been a stabilizing 
source of capital for those facing the harsh financial con-
sequences of the subprime mortgage meltdown of late 
2007 (Cho, 2008). Nevertheless, the recent proliferation 
of new SWFs, primarily established by authoritarian re-
gimes of Middle Eastern nations (flush with revenue from 
oil sales) and the People’s Republic of China (cash rich 
from consumer products sales), has initiated public policy 
introspection over national security concerns within many 
Western countries, the target market of the majority of re-
cent SWF equity purchases. The fact that many Western 
countries also operate SWFs makes this issue relevant for 
them as well. In a global economy ostensibly committed 
to the free flow of trade and investment, the resolution 
of this controversy is important to the continued mainte-
nance of the “openness” of this international economic 
system. To assist in maintaining a stable environment for 
the free flow of investment capital, there are three policy 
areas that must be resolved: (1) clarity in SWF corporate 
governance practices; (2) an understanding of the scope 
of the definition of “national security”; and (3) the issue 
of reciprocity in investment opportunities.
As mentioned earlier, the IMF has taken a leadership 
role in facilitating efforts by the IWG of Sovereign Wealth 
Funds to create a voluntary code of 24 generally accepted 
principles and practices—the Santiago Principles—for 
improving SWF corporate governance. This IMF-sup-
ported process has had the benefit of involving not only 
the countries operating the largest SWFs, but also recent 
corporate governance principles agreed upon by the 
United States, Singapore, and Abu Dhabi, the OECD, and 
the Commission of the European Communities—all shar-
ing marked similarities in substantive recommendations. 
The Santiago Principles will provide an international 
“baseline” of responsible SWF managerial practices. For 
it to be of practical value, however, each government ac-
cepting SWF investment will need to specify that the San-
tiago Principles are expected to be adhered to and that 
its transparency provisions will allow for periodic account-
ability/audit or certification by the host country. Wilson 
(2003) recognizes that voluntary self-regulation can be 
based on a form of inspection and certification of com-
pliance with established standards or business practices. 
To that end, the IMF may itself consider implementing a 
program of “fourth-party” certification (i.e., international 
regulation is undertaken by a governing body; Wilson, 
2003, p. 148) of SWFs who meet the requirements of the 
voluntary Santiago Principles, modeling itself loosely on 
the certification process of the United Nations’ Global 
Compact, but with a higher level of compliance account-
to develop regulations applicable to controlling the behav-
ior of SWFs (Bennhold, 2008). The Italian government is 
opposed to SWFs owning more than 5% of equity in Italian 
companies (Bennhold, 2008). French President Nicolas 
Sarkozy has expressed strong misgivings about the lack of 
reciprocity with the SWF host countries themselves, de-
manding that there be investment “reciprocity before we 
open Europe’s barriers” (“Sarkozy Attacks Wealth Funds,” 
2008). While supportive of a voluntary code of corporate 
governance, the French government has raised the possi-
bility of creating a list of “strategic sectors” of industry po-
tentially immune to foreign control (DLA Piper, 2008).32 
In November 2008, the French government announced 
the creation of a $29 billion Strategic Investment Fund 
to prevent the takeover of strategic French companies by 
foreign companies as well as to assist French companies to 
cope with the negative economic effects of the worldwide 
credit freeze (Caisse des Despots, 2008; Chassany, 2008).33 
In North America, the Canadian government launched 
a review of its Investment Canada Act, and in December 
2007, it issued guidelines clarifying the Investment Canada 
Act as it pertains to foreign state-owned enterprises (DLA 
Piper, 2008).34 Furthermore, since national security is not 
the focus of the guidelines, the Canadian government is 
currently considering a national security test as part of its 
foreign investment review process (DLA Piper, 2008).
Discussion and recommendat ions
The worldwide controversy surrounding SWFs has cre-
ated an unstable political, legal, and regulatory environ-
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be no more than 10% equity ownership through FDI in 
oil, gas, gold, and copper enterprises (US GAO, 2008); in 
Germany, no more than 25% voting equity ownership in 
firms having “strategic relevance” to the “public order” or 
“national security” (Biberovic, 2008).
There is evidence that controlling ownership inter-
est in a company can be generally acquired with 20% 
of direct and indirect voting equity ownership control 
(LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999, p. 477). 
One recommendation to address this contentious issue 
is to incorporate a conservative limit of no more than 
10% of any combination of SWF or government-owned 
enterprise equity ownership control in any designated, 
non-defense, strategic-sector firm.36 This limitation on 
equity ownership will preserve a continued flow of SWF/
FDI for passive commercial investment, while reasonably 
precluding management control of the firm (and the 
threat of geopolitical investment agenda) by the SWF, 
government-owned enterprise, or some collaboration. 
Such an ownership threshold can be included in bilateral 
negotiations between a prospective firm’s management/
board and the SWF management team/board (that, 
again, should reduce stakeholder concerns about the 
SWF’s ability to influence the management of the firm) 
or incorporated into the FDI laws and regulations of the 
host country. Furthermore, SWF managers contemplat-
ing equity acquisitions in the United States should assess 
the potential security implications of their investments 
early in the due diligence process and, if appropriate, 
schedule prefiling meetings with CFIUS staff.
The issue of reciprocity in FDI has again resurfaced, 
this time focusing on SWF investment. By definition, reci-
procity requires that free trade also be fair trade between 
countries (i.e., access to the same capital investment op-
portunities). Because of the right of sovereign nations 
to restrict SWFs or government-owned enterprises from 
investing in certain firms or industries considered to 
have a national security sensitivity, the fact is that there 
will be not be free or fair flow of invested capital by SWFs 
(or of FDI) between many countries. One approach to 
managing this situation is to have countries operate with 
an SWF/FDI policy that is both multilateral and bilateral. 
A multilateral policy toward SWF investment establishes 
the host country’s general position on reciprocity of FDI; 
the bilateral policy on SWF investment is negotiated be-
tween the host investment country and the SWF investor 
country through treaty agreement. The reciprocity rules 
are established between the two countries employing the 
most restrictive limitations on FDI (and SWF investment) 
found in both countries’ laws and regulations. This treaty 
agreement will allow for a “fair,” if not fully “free,” ex-
ability than is required by the Global Compact program. 
If established, a Standing Committee of Sovereign Wealth 
Funds (within the IMF) can be empowered to manage 
this Santiago Principles SWF certification process. For 
executives (and boards of directors) of firms who have 
SWF shareholders, or who are attempting to attract this 
type of equity investor, having an SWF investor who has 
received this voluntary Santiago Principles certification 
will help assuage the concerns of other firm stakeholders, 
including shareholders, employees, and national govern-
ments, and make it easier for SWF managers to execute 
an effective investment strategy. Insistence on mandatory 
SWF Santiago Principles certification (or other unbiased 
evidence of adherence) should be a requirement for ne-
gotiations by any executive or board of directors.
The scope of what can be defined as “national se-
curity” ranges from a narrow description of the defense 
sector to a broader view incorporating economic security 
and cultural policy. A broader interpretation of national 
security offers the potential for “protectionist” policies, 
although it is justifiable for economic security to be con-
sidered in a reasonable definition of the national security 
interest. Sovereign states exercise their legal rights to 
establish the scope of such restrictions on FDI, includ-
ing government-financed SWFs and government-owned 
enterprises. The argument for restrictions on SWF equity 
(voting) ownership involves the dedication of such capital 
investments to an investment strategy focusing on passive 
commercial success over time. This is where transparency 
in SWF operations is crucial: Is there a track record of pas-
sive commercial vs. geopolitical motivations behind such 
government-owned investments?
Since SWFs are extensions of national governments, 
it would be naïve to believe that countries that are geopo-
litical rivals would not be tempted to exercise their power 
to affect a rival’s economic stability given their opportu-
nities through control of voting equity stock in a major 
firm.35 For example, a top foreign policy advisor to then-
President Vladimir Putin, Sergei Prikhodko, announced 
in late 2006 that Russia might raise its equity ownership 
by VTB, a state-controlled bank, in the European Aero-
nautic Defence & Space Company, which owns Airbus, 
from 5% to over 25%, enough to block any major policy 
decisions (White et al., 2008). Recently, however, the Rus-
sian Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin indicated that Rus-
sia’s National Wealth Fund would follow the Norwegian 
SWF model and limit firm equity holdings to less than 5% 
ownership and not seek a management role (White et al., 
2008). Both the Russian and German governments are 
considering legislation to restrict foreign investment in 
strategic sectors of their economies. In Russia, there may 
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nance guidelines may not be enough to counter national 
legislation and policies, such as those being considered 
in Italy (5% limitation on SWF equity ownership) and 
implemented in France (Strategic Investment Fund), 
that overcompensates for the potential threats from such 
government-owned investment funds. As Simon Johnson 
(2007, p. 57), former economic counselor and director of 
the IMF’s Research Department, has argued, “[T]he real 
danger is that sovereign wealth funds (and other forms 
of government-backed vehicles) may encourage capital 
account protectionism, through which countries pick and 
choose who can invest in what.” This would indeed be a 
“lose-lose” environment for both SWFs and recipient host 
countries, as they now appear to need each other more 
than ever in the most recent global recession.
Notes
1. For the purpose of this article, the term national security is defined 
to include domestic political and economic stability, as well as national 
competitiveness and defense-related issues.
2. The Monitor Group (2008), a Cambridge, Massachusetts–based busi-
ness consulting and research firm, has recently found (as a result of a 
survey undertaken by the firm) that SWF investment in the financial 
sector has dropped significantly since the first quarter of 2008. The 
financial sector comprised $143.4 billion of SWF deal value in the first 
quarter of 2008, compared to $4 billion each in the second and third 
quarters of 2008.
3. Although in the United States, if a foreign SWF were to attempt to 
purchase 10% or more of equity ownership in the financial sector, 
it would likely trigger a congressional inquiry and potential political 
furor. 
4. The Monitor Group (2008) found that 46% of reported SWF deals 
in the third quarter of 2008 were domestic transactions, the highest 
percentage since 2003. Some analysts argue that SWFs should avoid 
investing in domestic industries, as it could create inflationary pressure 
and lead to inefficiency due to a major public-sector involvement in 
private-sector management (Waki, 2008). In October 2008, the Russian 
government announced it will use one of its SWFs to fund 50% of the 
$34.18 billion subordinate loans package designed to bolster its flagging 
banking system (Vorobyova, 2008).
5. The Monitor Group (2008) reports that 54% of second- and third-
quarter 2008 SWF deals by value ($23 billion out of $42 billion) were 
in emerging markets, the highest share of total SWF deal value since 
2005.
6. It is also reported that Germany’s Siemens, a major GE competitor, is 
in similar negotiations with other SWFs (Zawya, 2008).
7. This SWF investment translates into SWFs owning up to 20% of global 
real estate by 2015 (Propertywire, 2008).
8. This definition is designed to differentiate SWFs initially funded by 
net foreign assets (through commodity exports or exchange-rate inter-
vention) from, for example, ordinary domestic pension funds that are 
initially funded in domestic currency but that may then diversify inter-
nationally (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2007a). Jen (2007), while 
essentially agreeing with the preceding U.S. Department of Treasury 
definition, argues that a definition of SWF should explicitly include 
that it: (1) be sovereign, (2) have high foreign currency exposure, (3) 
possess no explicit liabilities, (4) be characterized by high-risk tolerance, 
and (5) is focused on a long investment horizon.
9. There are other commentators, such as Gai and Shin (2003), who 
argue that, while transparency can be an effective instrument for limit-
ing the moral hazard (and encouraging financial stability) of investors 
and national governments, care should be exercised regarding the types 
change in FDI between the two countries, and perhaps 
incentivize both countries to periodically reappraise 
the efficacy of FDI limitations established in law and 
regulation—a national economic policy that should be 
aggressively lobbied for by national business associations 
encouraging free and fair trade. 
As previously mentioned, there is every indication 
that SWF equity investment will continue to grow in the 
upcoming decade. In the present global financial crisis, 
however, the value of SWFs in the Middle East have 
exacted significant losses primarily due to a nearly 71% 
decline in oil prices, from a monthly average of $133.93 a 
barrel (of West Texas Intermediate Crude) for June 2008 
to $39.16 for February 2009. Most of these Middle Eastern 
SWFs have reportedly either stopped investing or have 
become increasingly risk-averse in purchasing foreign 
assets in recent months, and are using their SWFs to ex-
pand public-sector spending in the hopes of stimulating 
their own slumping, oil-based economies (Knowledge@
Wharton, 2009; Setser & Ziemba, 2009). Moreover, Asian 
SWFs, including those of the People’s Republic of China 
and Malaysia, are also taking a conservative view regard-
ing investment opportunities during the first half of 2009, 
awaiting the global recession to work itself out (Booth, 
2009; “Economic Crisis Hits Sovereign Wealth Funds,” 
2009). One example of the impact of the world economic 
recession on the value of an SWF is Singapore’s Temasek 
Holdings, whose management reported a 31% drop in 
the value of its investment holdings (to $81 billion) from 
March through November 2008 (“Economic Crisis Hits 
Sovereign Wealth Funds,” 2009). 
In an interview at the 2009 World Economic Forum 
held in Davos, Switzerland, Sameer al-Ansari, the CEO 
of Dubai International Capital, a $13 billion SWF, said 
that “there (is) going to be a great opportunity in the 
next year or two to acquire assets at historically unprec-
edented levels” (Booth, 2009). However, Donald DeMa-
rino, cochairman of the National U.S.-Arab Chamber of 
Commerce, cautions that “the inactivity of the funds dur-
ing the [financial] meltdown” can be explained by “the 
treacherous political environment for them in the West” 
(Knowledge@Wharton, 2009). Remembering the Dubai 
Port World controversy in 2005, the National U.S.-Arab 
Chamber of Commerce’s DeMarino believes that Middle 
Eastern SWF managers will be ever cognizant of Western 
concerns of “Arabs buying up assets too cheaply” (Knowl-
edge@Wharton, 2009).
Nonetheless, over the long run, the Santiago Prin-
ciples will provide some self-regulatory relief for SWF 
recipient nations, but even if generally adopted by most 
of the world’s major SWF funds, these corporate gover-
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18. A “conventional” or “passive” SWF investment strategy means not 
actively exercising corporate governance voting rights and seeking tradi-
tional investor returns (i.e., stock appreciation and dividend payments). 
In contrast, a “strategic” SWF investment strategy involves a potential 
noncommercial or political agenda by the investing country.
19. Singh (2008) notes this “double-standard” practiced by Western pol-
icymakers, as they tend to overlook similar, or greater, levels of secrecy 
and unaccountability presently practiced by hedge funds, private equity 
funds, and investment banks, However, unlike these privately held 
financial investment instruments, SWFs with political motives might ac-
cept financial losses if their governments believed their political gains 
would offset their economic losses (Rose, 2008).
20. The Exon-Florio Amendment, that established CFIUS, is found in 
the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 § 5021, Pub. L. 
No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (1988) (codified at 50 U.S.C. App. § 2170).
21. Foreign direct investment is defined “as the purchase of real assets 
abroad for the purpose of acquiring a lasting interest in an enterprise 
and exerting a degree of influence on that enterprise’s operations” (US 
GAO, 2008, p. 5).
22. Under the final regulations issued by the U.S. Department of the 
Treasury, there are six new factors to be considered by CFIUS or the 
President of the United States (Bingham, 2008):
 1.  Whether the transaction has a security-related impact on “critical 
infrastructure,” including major energy assets;
 2.  Whether the transaction has a security-related impact on “critical 
technologies”;
 3.  Whether the transaction involves control by a foreign govern-
ment;
 4.  A review of the current assessment of (i) the adherence of the 
subject country to non-proliferation control regime, including trea-
ties and multilateral supply guidelines, (ii) the relationship of such 
country with the U.S., specifically on its record of cooperating with 
the U.S. in counter-terrorism, and (iii) the potential for transship-
ment or diversion of technologies with military applications, includ-
ing an analysis of national export control laws and regulations;
 5.  The long-term projection of U.S. requirements for sources of en-
ergy and other critical resources and material; and
 6.  Such other factors as the President determines are appropriate.
23. Rose (2008) believes that the FINSA regulations broadly interpret 
“control” so as to diminish the sphere of shareholder “influence,” 
including determining, directing, or deciding “important (company) 
matters” or where an SWF causes the appointment or dismissal of of-
ficers or senior managers.
24. The President’s Working Group on Financial Markets has initiated 
a review of SWFs, and the U.S. Department of the Treasury recently es-
tablished a working group that has initiated policy analyses and regular 
reporting to the U.S. Congress on SWF acquisition activity (Kimmitt, 
2008).
25. It is important to note that pending FDI transactions may have been 
politically discouraged from proceeding through to the conclusion of a 
formal review process (that exists in nine of the 11 countries surveyed by 
the US GAO), resulting in companies voluntarily withdrawing from the 
investment opportunity before a formal decision is rendered.
26. The Commission’s principles of good governance include (Commis-
sion of the European Communities, 2008, p. 10):
	 •	 	the	clear	allocation	and	separation	of	responsibilities	in	the	inter-
nal governance structure of an SWF;
	 •	 	the	development	and	issuance	of	an	investment	policy	that	defines	
the overall objectives of SWF investment;
	 •	 	the	existence	of	operational	autonomy	for	the	entity	to	achieve	its	
defined objectives;
	 •	 	public	 disclosure	 of	 the	 general	 principles	 governing	 an	 SWF’s	
relationship with governmental authority;
	 •	 	the	disclosure	of	the	general	principles	of	internal	governance	that	
provides assurances of integrity; and 
	 •	 	the	development	and	issuance	of	risk	management	policies.
of information provided to the marketplace. Gai and Shin (2003) posit 
that, while the disclosed information must be coherent and open, it 
must also be selective, as certain information may exacerbate a crisis 
situation a financial institution is confronting (e.g., if the New York 
Federal Reserve had required the management of hedge fund Long-
Term Capital Management in September 1998 to publicly announce its 
trading positions as a precondition for facilitating the coordination of 
its creditors, this decision would have exposed its greatest vulnerabilities 
and served as a coordinating signal to exploit the weakened position of 
the distressed parties in the crisis).
10. Based on their interpretation of IMF data, between December 2001 
and October 2007, global foreign exchange reserves from which SWFs 
are bankrolled nearly tripled from $2.1 trillion to $6.2 trillion, with 
more than 80% concentrated in the developing world (Griffith-Jones 
& Ocampo, 2008).
11. However, Stephen Jen, an economist at Morgan Stanley, London, 
estimates that the world’s SWFs have declined between 18 and 25% in 
2008 (due to a precipitous decline in oil prices resulting from a world-
wide recession tamping down consumer demand), bringing the world’s 
SWFs’ total value down to between $2.3 trillion and $2.5 trillion (Reed, 
2008).
12. In a recent econometric study of 53 SWF equity purchases from 
1989 to 2008, Fotak, Bortolotti, and Megginson (2008) found that SWF 
investment may have a significant negative impact on corporate finan-
cial returns (i.e., the average abnormal buy-and-hold return is a negative 
40.96%, as measured 480 trading days after the SWF investment occurs). 
The Global Institute estimated that as of July 2008, SWFs had collectively 
lost $14 billion in equity assets from recent investments in the financial 
sector (Farrell, Lund, & Sadan, 2008).
13. The Monitor Group found that SWF investments in strategic sec-
tors of the economy (e.g., transportation, defense, aerospace, and high 
technology) consisted of less than 1% of all equity purchases, and when 
expanding the strategic sectors to include energy and utilities, under 
5% of all SWF acquisitions were for controlling interests in OECD mar-
kets (Miracky et al., 2008).
14. For example, in January 2006, Singapore’s Temasek SWF purchased 
from the family of the then-Prime Minister of Thailand, Thaksin 
Shinawatra, a controlling stake in the Thai telecommunications Shin 
Corporation, that included control of space satellites used by the Thai 
military (Weiss, 2008). This financial transaction caused a political crisis 
in Thailand, resulting in the collapse of the Prime Minister’s govern-
ment (Weiss, 2008). 
15. “Strategic assets” correlates with “critical infrastructure” defined by 
the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2006, p. 7) as “the assets, 
systems, networks, and functions that provide vital services to the Na-
tion” and that are largely owned and operated by the private sector.
16. The Linaburg-Maduell Transparency Index is based on ten prin-
ciples depicting SWF transparency to the public. These ten principles, 
each carrying a weight of “one point,” are (Sovereign Wealth Fund 
Institute, 2008c):
	 •	 	Fund	 provides	 history,	 including	 reason	 for	 creation,	 origin	 of	
wealth, and government ownership structure.
	 •	 	Fund	provides	up-to-date	independently	audited	annual	reports.
	 •	 	Fund	 provides	 ownership	 percentage	 of	 company	 holdings,	 and	




ment policies, and enforcer of guidelines.
	 •	 	Fund	provides	clear	strategies	and	objectives.





tion, such as telephone and fax.
17. It is against Kuwaiti law for the Kuwait Investment Authority to pub-
licize its assets’ worth (Portman, 2008).
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est economic return,” but 36.4% answered “potential strategic benefit/
investment for relevant wealth fund jurisdiction.”
36. In some cases, “pyramiding schemes,” where there are a sequence of 
firms having control over the next one (thus, forming a control chain), 
allow for indirect voting rights potentially being combined with direct 
voting rights in the firm and effectively exceeding the 20% control 
threshold (LaPorta et al., 1999; Leechor, 1999). The recommended 
10% direct equity ownership limit will mitigate the possibility for this 
type of control situation to occur.
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